My original comment was meant as a pushback against your assertion that the secret key makes 1Password more secure than Bitwarden (and other password managers).įor a user who has a sufficiently strong vault password, this is not accurate, as the local and cloud vaults will be uncrackable with or without the secret key.įor a user who has a weak password, the secret key will protect the cloud vault, but not the local vault, so in this very limited sense (cloud vault protection for users with weak passwords), your original claim is valid. Comparing to a baseline of 1 iteration, then you can get the equivalent of 12-21 bits over the allowed range of 5k-2000k for the custom KDF iterations (the default would be 17 bits for 100,000 iterations). However, I agree with your point: this amount of entropy is still more than plenty - 128 bits is overkill.Ī decent amount of PBKDF2 iterations will further add 14-19 bits of entropy.Ĭompared to what? If comparing to the default number of client-side iterations in Bitwarden (100,000), then you can increase the number of iterations at most by a factor of 20, which is equivalent to an entropy increase of only 4 bits. You can customize your KDF iterations in the Account Settings, up to 2,000,000.Ī decent passphrase will have the same or higher entropy (128 bits)įor most people, a good passphrase will consist of 5-7 diceware words, optionally with capitalization and a number thrown in, which will only get you 70-97 bits of entropy. I do think Bitwarden should increase the iterations by a slight amount (not till 310k) This protects the vault when not on a user’s device which makes it essentially impossible for an attacker to break into. So to sum things up, the Secret Key is mixed with the Master Password and an attacker would have to bruteforce both at the same time (completely different than just bruteforcing one then the other). That being said, it isn’t as big of a deal since 1Password is mixing two different things together then doing KDF and making a key. As of 2021, OWASP recommended at least 310,000 but most password managers use 100,000-200,000. Most vendors use a small PBKDF2 iteration round count. They are not just two separate things to bruteforce. The Secret Key is entangled with the Master Password to form the encryption key. Most users are not security-aware and won’t use long random passwords. Therefore, if the attack that happened at LastPass were to happen at 1Password, you’d be protected. The Secret Key’s purpose is only to protect the vault with another layer of protection if the vault were stolen from 1Password’s servers (not meant to protect against malware). This is no different than any other product. First off, if your phone or computer are infected with malware, of course it can capture both your password and key.
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